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FLIGHT INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
TAXATION: A CRITICAL EXAMI-
NATION OF THE NOEL CASE
JOHN D. JOHNSTON, JR.*
T HOUGHTFUL observers have long recognized, and gen-
erally accepted, the fact that the Anglo-American tradition of
judicial review often forces judges to assume a policy-making role.
This function results, in part, from the conviction that older pre-
cedents should be periodically re-evaluated in the contemporary con-
text. In certain areas, however, the primary policy-making
responsibility rests with the legislature. Taxation is an example;
discussion of a tax problem should proceed from the pertinent
revenue act itself.
Statutory construction is eminently a judicial function, to be
sure. But existing authority may be entitled to considerable judicial
deference. Such authority may consist, for example, of an admin-
istrative interpretation that has received judicial approval over a
period of sufficient length to justify an inference of legislative
acquiescence. Summary rejection of this type of authority may pro-
duce an unsound result. An example, in the writer's opinion, is
In re Noel's Estate.'
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of June 19, 1956, Marshall Noel and his wife
drove from their home in New Jersey to Idlewild Airport, where
Noel purchased a round trip ticket to Caracas, Venezuela. He then
applied for two policies of air travel accident insurance2 with death
Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Duke University School of Law;
Editor, JOuRNAL OF LEGAL EDUCAMlON. This article was suggested by the author's col-
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332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel,
379 U.S. 927 (1964) (No. 503).
2 One policy was issued by The Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, the other
by Continental Casualty Co. Both were sold and countersigned by an employee of
Airport Sales Corp., the authorized selling agent for each insurer.
The Fidelity application was so worded that only the insured could apply for
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benefits in the amount of 125,000 dollars, naming his wife the
beneficiary of the accidental death benefit provisions of each policy.
After completing the applications, Noel handed them to the sales
clerk; the five dollars in premiums was paid by his wife. When
the clerk had countersigned the policies, Noel instructed him to
hand the policies to Mrs. Noel, who retained them in her custody.
Each policy contained provisions reserving to the insured the right
to assign or surrender the policy and to change the beneficiary a Some
three hours after take-off Noel's plane crashed into the Atlantic
Ocean, leaving no survivors. In due course his widow made claim
for the accidental death benefits of the air travel insurance policies
and received the proceeds. When the estate tax return was filed by
Noel's executors, the flight insurance proceeds were not included in
his gross estate. The Commissioner determined a deficiency, and the
case was heard by the Tax Court.4
The estate advanced two contentions: first, that the proceeds of
air travel insurance are not "insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent" under section 2042 (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code;5 and second, that even if such proceeds are "life insurance,"
they should not be taxed to the decedent's estate because at the
time of his death he retained no incidents of ownership in the poli-
cies. Both contentions were rejected by the Tax Court. Relying on
a 1929 decision of the Board of Tax Appeals,6 in which accidental
coverage. The Continental application could be signed by someone other than the
insured, provided the insured gave his consent in writing. Brief for Petitioners-
Appellants, p. 3.
8 Each policy contained the following clause: "CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY: The
right to change of beneficiary is reserved to the insured and the consent of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries shall not be requisite to surrender or assignment of this
policy or to any change of beneficiary or beneficiaries, or to any other changes in
this policy." Estate of Marshall Noel, 39 T.C. 466, 469 (1963).
'Ibid.
INT. REv. CoDe OF 1954, § 2042 provides in part as follows:
"SEC. 2042. PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE.
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
"(1) RECErvABLE BY Tim ExEcuTo.-To the extent of the amount receivable by the
executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
"(2) Ra cEivABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARiEs.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of owner-
ship, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the term 'incident of ownership' includes a reversionary
interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or
by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 per-
cent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent..
ILeopold Ackerman, 15 B.TA. 635 (1929).
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death benefits of several life and accident insurance policies had
been held includible in the decedent's estate under a comparable
provision of the Revenue Act of 1924, 7 the court stated that
the matter has been settled for too long a period to warrant re-
examination. The statutory provisions involved are substantially
identical as they relate to this question. We follow Ackerman
here.8
The court further held that the decedent's reserved right to change
the beneficiary was an incident of ownership in the policy, render-
ing the proceeds includible in his estate9 irrespective of the practi-
cal difficulties in actually changing the beneficiary. 10 Finally, the
court found that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish
an oral assignment of the policies to Mrs. Noel."
The executors appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, reiterating both contentions. The Commissioner insisted
that flight insurance proceeds are includible under section 2042 (2).
I Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302 (g), 43 Stat. 305.
839 T.C. at 470.
" It has been uniformly held that the right to change the beneficiary is an inci-
dent of ownership in a life insurance policy. See LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDAuL EsTATz
AND Gr-" TAxEs 280 n.34 (2d ed. 1962).
LO Once he has boarded the plane, a passenger would find it extremely difficult
to effect a, change of beneficiary. The Tax Court relied on the fact that Noel had
purchased coverage for a round trip, "and in the normal course the right to change
the beneficiary would have been meaningful prior to commencement of the return
trip." 39 T.C. at 472.
This reasoning would not appear to apply to coverage for a one-way trip. The
crucial question is this: does a right or power cease to be an "incident of owner.
ship" when its possessor is unable to exercise it? The Code is, perhaps, equivocal.
Section 2642 (2) refers to incidents of ownership possessed by the decedent, exercisable
either alone or in conjunction with, another person. See note 5 supra. Whether this
imposes a dual requirement of possession plus exercisability, or whether the "exer-
cisable" clause merely serves to specify that powers possessed jointly by the insured
and other persons will result in taxation of life insurance proceeds, has not been
decided by the Supreme Court. The Treasury takes the latter view, however, and
has been upheld in the Tax Court and several courts of appeal. See Estate of John
J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963); Estate of Virginia H. West, 9 T.C. 736 (1947), ag'd,
173 F.2d 505 (8th dir. 1949); Estate of Edward L. Hurd, 6 T.C. 819 (1946), aff'd,
160 F.2d 610 (Ist Cir. 1947); Rev. Rul. 123, 1961-62 Cum. BuLL. 151.
21 The court thus avoided a choice of law problem: oral assignments of insurance
are valid in New Jersey, but more doubtful in New York. Compare Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J.Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (1946), with McNamee v. Griffin,
137 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 864, 131 N.E.2d 284 (1955) and Katzman
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E,2d 307 (1955).
If an assignment is valid and divests the insured of all incidents of ownership,
no tax is incurred under § 2042 (2). If death occurs within three years of the transfer,
however, the proceeds may be taxable under § 2035 as a transfer in contemplation
of death. LOWNDES & KRAmER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 286-87. See text accompany-
ing notes 104-05 infra.
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He further contended that if the court should find a valid assign-
ment of the policies to Mrs. Noel, the proceeds were taxable under
section 2035 as a transfer in contemplation of death.' 2 The Third
Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding in favor of the estate on
the ground that air travel accident insurance proceeds are not "in-
surance under policies on the life of the decedent" under section
2042 (2). The reasoning of Ackerman was expressly rejected.13
The Noel case represents a major interpretation of section 2042
affecting millions of air travel accident insurance policyholders.14
Moreover, the Third Circuit's rationale is broad enough to cast
doubt on the taxability of other forms of accidental death insur-
ance.", An understanding of the issues presented requires an ex-
amination of insurance concepts as well as the history, purpose and
proper construction of section 2042.
II
THE "DISTINCTION" BETWEEN LIFE AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE
A. The Opinion
Although the title of section 2042 is "Proceeds of Life Insur-
ance," the term "life insurance" does not appear in the statute itself.
Instead, the term "policies on the life of the decedent" is used.' 6
It seems clear that the latter terminology is susceptible to a broader
interpretation than the former, and that under settled rules of statu-
tory construction the wording of the statute itself, rather than the
12 Brief for Respondent, pp. 15-16. See note 11 supra.
"s 332 F.2d at 952.
"4The president of the corporation acting as selling agent for the companies
issuing the two Noel policies testified that between seven and eight million such
policies are sold annually. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, p. 16a. Fortunately, air
travel has become considerably safer during the past three decades. In 1957-59, the
passenger death rate for scheduled airliners was approximately one-third the rate of
automobile travel on turnpikes. ME'ROPOUTAN Lrm INS. Co., STATtsmcAL BULL., Aug.
1960, p. 10.
The insurance payout for air disasters, however, is very high. For instance, a
total of 18.6 million dollars was paid by life and casualty insurers to beneficiaries
of victims of four air crashes in 1962. Included in this figure is 8.8 million dollars
in "travel accident insurance death payments." INSrTUT oF LIFE INS., LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BooK 42 (1963).
IFor example, term policies (accident policies written for a specific term of
years, rather than for a single trip) and accidental death benefit provisions of life
insurance contracts (the so-called "double indemnity" ciause). Accidental death bene-
fits "paid under double indemnity and similar protection" totalled 73 million dollars
in 1962. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INS., LiFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 39-42 (1963).
10 See note 5 supra.
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title, should control.17 The Third Circuit proceeded as though "life
insurance" were the critical term, and the result reached in the
case was made to depend upon whether the policies in question
could be characterized as "life insurance" or "accident insurance."
Having reduced the controversy to these terms, the opinion pro-
ceeded to consider the distinction between the two types of insur-
ance. Life insurance was found to be payable
upon the occurrence of an inevitable event. The contingency in-
sured against is the death of the insured regardless of its cause
unless, of course, the cause is one excepted under the policy....
Life insurance has several economic and investment features not
common to accident insurance. Upon issuance of the policy the
insurer assumes an absolute risk of loss and the insured acquires
an immediate estate which by the terms of the policy is transfer-
able on his death.' 8
Accident policies, on the other hand, were found to be payable
for any loss sustained by reason of an event which is evitable and
not likely to occur. The contingency insured against is the acci-
dent, death being only one of several liability creating conse-
quences .... Upon issuance of the policy the insurer assumes a
conditional risk of loss and the insured, as well as the beneficiary,
acquire nothing more than an inchoate and defeasible right.10
The distinction which the court drew is defective in several respects.
First, not all policies of life insurance have "economic and invest-
ment features not common to accident insurance." Term life insur-
ance policies contain no investment features; 20 neither do accidental
death benefit, or "double indemnity," provisions of ordinary life in-
surance policies.2 ' Secondly, it is not true that upon issuance of
life insurance policies the insurer "assumes an absolute risk of loss."
Death by certain causes may be excluded from coverage, and the
insurer may avoid liability in cases where the insured is guilty of
breach of warranty, misrepresentation or concealment in procuring
issuance of the policy. Moreover, under a term life insurance policy
risk of loss is conditioned upon death within the term of the policy.
""It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed . .. . [Tihe name given to an
act by way of designation or description ...cannot change the plain import of its
words." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 490 (1916). See also Crooks
v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
2S 332 F.2d at 952.
'Old. at 952-53.
2" See REGEL & LOMAN, INSURANCE 56 (1921).
21See generally KNiGHT, ADVANCED Ln INSURANCE 254-59 (1926).
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The insured simply buys protection during the period of the term,
and the insurer incurs liability only if death occurs within the
stated term.2 2 The policy coverage can terminate in a number of
ways, including non-renewal23  (and termination of employment
under employee group insurance plans paid for by the employer).24
Perhaps the crux of the distinction drawn by the Third Circuit
between life and accident insurance is its view of the operative
contingencies that determine the insurer's liability. In life insur-
ance, the contingency insured against was stated to be "the death
of the insured regardless of its cause unless, of course, the cause is
one excepted under the policy."2 On the other hand, in accident
insurance the contingency insured against was found to be "the
accident, death being only one of several liability creating conse-
quences."28 This distinction is spurious, since more than a mere
accident is required before the insurer becomes liable under an
accident insurance policy. If an accident occurs, but the insured
is not injured, no liability is incurred. Liability is conditioned upon
an accident plus an additional contingency resulting from it. If the
other contingency is non-fatal injury to the insured, the disability
provisions of the policy become effective. 27 If the additional factor
is death of the insured, then the face amount of the policy is pay-
able to the stated beneficiary. The death of the insured, far from
being "only one of several liability creating consequences," is as
much a prerequisite for liability under a death benefit provision as
22 "A term policy is one under which the sum insured becomes payable provided
the person insured dies within a stated period.... It covers a contingency only and
not a certainty, as do other kinds of policies." MACLEAN, LirE INSURANCE 48 (5th ed.
1939).
"Normally, the premiums increase as the insured's age advances. Thus the insured
who is in good health has little incentive to renew his coverage. "iThere is bound
to be a strong selection exercised against the company at the time of renewal, and
this selection will be increasingly great as the age and the renewal premium increase.
The temptation to drop a policy which calls for increasingly greater premiums will
cause many of those who remain in good health to fail to renew at the time a
premium increase takes effect. On the other hand, the majority of those who are
in poor health will almost certainly take advantage of the right of renewal, with
the result that as time goes on the mortality experience among the surviving
policyholders will be increasingly unfavorable." MACLEAN, Op. Cit. supra note 22, at 53.
2 CRAWFORD & HA.AN, GROUP INSURANCE § 32 (1936); GaG, GRoup LIE INSUR-
ANcE 32-33 (rev. ed. 1957); ILs, GROUP INSURANCE AND EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS
93 (1953).
21332 F.2d at 952.
"0 Ibid.
27 Each policy provided for payment to the insured of specific amounts for certain
bodily injuries sustained as a result of an air crash. 39 T.C. at 468.
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the accident itself. Neither contingency is independent. Both must
occur in sequence: first the accident, then the resulting death.
B. Other Arguments
The executors relied upon several other alleged distinctions be-
tween life and accident insurance which were not mentioned in
the opinion. For instance, the companies which issued the policies
to Noel were not authorized to issue life insurance;28 they were
licensed casualty insurers. A state regulatory distinction should not,
of course, be incorporated into an Internal Revenue Code provision
without some evidence that Congress so intended.20 Since no such
evidence was presented with regard to this distinction and section
2042 (2), the court properly refused to consider this argument.
In support of their contention that life and accident insurance
cover different risks, the" executors argued that in the case of life
insurance the age, health, occupation and moral character of the
insured are relevant, whereas such factors are not taken into con-
sideration in issuing flight insurance.30 Two observations may be
made which appear to controvert this contention. First, most group
life insurance policies require no formal application, physical ex-
amination or assessment of moral character by the insurer.3 1 Under
many group plans the premium is not variable according to the
age of the insured.82 Secondly, while age, health and occupation
of the insured are not relevant in issuing flight insurance (where
no insured has control over the plane) or group accident and health
policies paid for by employers, these factors are relevant in the
issuance of individual health and accident policies.
83
2
s Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. 6, 17a.
s9 See, e.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1954).
80 Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. 6, 18a. For a discussion of the relevance
of these factors to the estate tax definition of "insurance," see text accompanying
notes 80-84 infra.
8 See Estate of Keller v. Commissioner, 312 US. 543, 545 (1941).
8 2 The premium is, of course, determined by reference to the "average age" of
the group. Employee contributions are on the basis of a "flat rate," however. GncC,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 182-83. See generally id. ch. VII. See also ILSE, op. cit. supra
note 24, chs. 4-5.
The New York Stock Exchange gratuity fund, held to be "life insurance" in
Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950), was a level-premium assess-
ment unrelated to age, health or living habits of exchange members. See text accom-
panying notes 80-84 infra.
21 See Miller, Rates and Reserves-Personal Commercial and Noncancellable Con.
tracts, in ACCIDENT AND SICKNEss INSURANCE 184-91 (McCahan ed, 1954).
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Perhaps the most amazing contention raised by the executors
was that policies of flight insurance, unlike life insurance, are "not
used in estate planning."34 In the Tax Court the president of the
sales agency for the two Noel policies was permitted so to testify.35
This extraordinary testimony was rebutted, however, by the widow
of the insured, who testified that "he [Noel] was doing an awful
lot of air traveling and I was a little worried about it and if any-
thing happened, we36 would be protected.1
3 7
C. The Supporting Authority
The unsoundness of the Third Circuit's conclusion that section
2042 incorporates a distinction between accident insurance and life
insurance is further revealed by the four cases cited in support of
its reasoning.
In the first case, Bowles v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n,3s
an applicant for health and accident insurance represented that he
had no other health and accident insurance then in force. In fact,
he had previously submitted an application for a life insurance
policy with an accidental death benefits clause. After the issuance
of the accident policy the insured suffered accidental eye injuries.
In seeking to avoid liability under its contract, the accident insurer
contended that the insured had breached a provision requiring him
to notify it if he took out "additional insurance."3 9 The court held
that this clause imposed a duty on the insured to notify the insurer
if he took out additional accident or health insurance. It then
proceeded to consider the question whether the accidental death
benefits provision of the life insurance policy subsequently issued
to the insured constituted coverage of the type which the insured
I' Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, p. 6.
85 1d. at p. 18a.
8 6An apparent reference to herself and the couple's three daughters.
37 Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, p. 22a.
-199 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1938).
11 The following question had apparently been answered in the affirmative by the
insured:
"18. Do you hereby apply to the Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association
for a policy to be based upon the foregoing statements of facts, and do you under-
stand and agree that the falsity of any statement in this application shall bar the
right to recover if such false statement is made with intent to deceive or materially
affects either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the Association,
and do you agree to notify the Association promptly of any change in your occupa-
tion, or if you take additional insurance, and do you hereby authorize any physician
or other person who has intended [sic] or may attend you to disclose any information
thus acquired?" Id. at 46.
. Vol. 1965: 32]
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had a duty to disclose. The court concluded that the notice clause
was ambiguous on this point, invoked the usual canon of constru-
ing the provisions of an insurance policy in the light most favorable
to the insured, and held that failure to disclose the accidental death
benefits provisions of the life insurance policy was not a breach of
the notice provision. The opinion stated that:
It is clear there is a real difference between a life policy with
double indemnity and disability benefits and an accident and
health policy, such as we have here, providing for death benefits.
The dominant purpose of the two kinds of policies is entirely
different, the risks which they cover overlap in only a small seg-
ment, and it would not occur to the ordinary man that one was
additional insurance of the sort covered by the other. When, in
addition to this, those skilled in insurance are in disagreement as
to whether life insurance with double indemnity and disability
features should be counted as additional health or accident insur-
ance, language of a life and accident policy requiring disclosure
of additional insurance of such character cannot be held to em-
brace life insurance policies with double indemnity and disability
features without doing violence to the well settled rule of con-
struction to which we have referred.40
The court quoted with approval from a Ninth Circuit case, Mutual
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Dobler,41 involving the converse issue:
whether, in an application for a life insurance policy, the applicant
was required to disclose an accident policy which provided death
benefits. There, after discussing the "recognized distinction between
life and accident insurance," 42 the court proceeded to decide the
case on the basis of ambiguity in the wording of the question pro-
pounded to the applicant.4 3
40 d. at 47. The following stipulation had been entered into by the parties:
"There is a difference of opinion among insurance men generally as to whether
disability insurance such as provided by the riders attached to the plaintiff's Equitable
Life policies should be considered embraced within the meaning of the term 'accident
or health insurance.' Some companies do and some companies do not count it in
determining the amount of sickness or accident indemnity they will write for an
applicant. Some companies ask in their application blanks specific questions as to
whether the applicant has life insurance with disability benefits and the amount
thereof." Ibid.
,1137 Fed. 550 (9th Cir. 1905).
'
2 1d. at 553.
48 "But it is not necessary to rest the decision of this branch of the case upon
the recognized distinction between life and accident insurance. In any view of the
case, we think that the most that can be claimed in behalf of the plaintiff in error
for the questions so propounded to the applicant was that they were so worded as
to leave it uncertain whether they called for a disclosure of the accident insurance
which he carried at that time. If the insurance company in its printed application
[Vol. 1965: 32
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It is submitted that both Bowles and Dobler reached sound re-
sults. In each case the insurer apparently urged a hypertechnical
construction of its contract that was at variance with lay under-
standing. The two opinions certainly indicated that there is some
doubt whether accidental death benefit provisions of life insurance
policies are "accident insurance," and whether death benefit pro-
visions of accident policies are "life insurance." It was precisely
this doubt-existing in the minds of both laymen and insurance
experts44-that prompted the court in each instance to construe the
notice clause against the insurer. The actual holdings of Bowles
and Dobler then, are that where there is ambiguity in a notice
clause, a difference between life and accident insurance will be rec-
ognized in order to prevent forfeiture.
The second case relied upon by the Third Circuit to reinforce
its distinction between accident and life insurance was Baumann v.
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co.45 There, an applicant for accident insurance
falsely denied that other insurers had previously refused his appli-
cation for accident, health or life insurance. The outcome of the
case depended upon whether this misstatement was a representation
or a warranty.46 Counsel for the insured attempted to invoke a
statute providing that misstatements in policies issued "by any life
insurance corporation," should, in the absence of fraud, be deemed
representations and not warranties. 47 The court held this statute
inapplicable because of the specific reference to life insurance cor-
porations. The plaintiff's policy was issued by an accident insurance
employed ambiguous terms or words of doubtful import, it cannot complain if they
were construed as they were by the applicant, or if the agent so advised him as to
their meaning." Id. at 553-54.
"See note 40 supra.
"r 225 N.Y. 480, 122 N.E. 628 (1919).
"'The trial court had directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground of
breach of warranty. If the statement was a warranty, this action was correct: falsity
is the only issue in warranty cases, and the falsity of this statement was clearly shown.
If the statement i0as a representation, however, the insurer would not have been
released from liability unless it was both false and either material to the risk assumed
by the insurer or made with actual intent to deceive. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 155,
§ 2 at 280. Plaintiff contended that this was a representation, presenting a question
of fact as to materiality which should have been submitted to the jury. 225 N.Y.
at 484, 122 N.E. at 628.
1'7N.Y. Sess. Laws 1906, ch. 526, § 16 provided that:
"Every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state on or after the
first day of January, nineteen hundred and seven, by any life insurance corporation
doing business within the state shall contain the entire contract between the parties
... and all statements purporting to be made by the insured shall in the absence of
fraud be deemed representations and not warranties. ..."
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corporation and was an "accident policy," even though it provided
for indemnity in case of death resulting from bodily injury effected
through accidental means. The court justified its decision on the
ground that:
It seems impossible that the experienced insurance men who
framed the Insurance Law failed for a moment to have in mind
the distinction between life insurance and accident insurance.
The law is full of provisions which distinguish between them.
Even in the popular speech, life insurance and accident insur-
ance mean entirely different things.48
It is arguable that mention of the "distinction between life in-
surance and accident insurance" was unnecessary in Baumann. The
statute applied only to policies of insurance "issued ... by any life
insurance corporation," and the defendant was not a life insurance
corporation by regulatory classification. Hence, the statute was not
applicable. Mere allusion to the "distinction," with no attempt to
indicate its relevance to the issue before the court, served no useful
purpose. In fact it served only to mislead.
The third case relied upon by the Third Circuit involved the
interpretation of a partnership buy-sell agreement executed by two
accountants. In Oglesby-Barnitz Bank &' Trust Co. v. Clark,49 each
of two partners had agreed to insure his own life in the sum
of 10,000 dollars, naming the other partner as beneficiary. Upon
the death of one of the partners, the proceeds of the policy on his
life were to be used to purchase his interest in the partnership. It
appeared that each partner had in fact taken out a 10,000 dollar
life insurance policy as required by the agreement, and each had
raised the limits of coverage from 10,000 to 20,000 dollars several
years thereafter. In addition, each had procured accidental death
policies in the amount of 10,000 dollars, designating the other as
beneficiary. These policies had also been increased from 10,000 to
20,000 dollars some years later. One of the partners died, and the
amount payable by the survivor for the decedent's interest was con-
troverted. The decedent's executor claimed that the entire pro-
ceeds of both policies, 40,000 dollars, was payable under the agree-
ment. The trial court so held. The Ohio Court of Appeals held,
however, that only 10,000 dollars was due and payable to the dece-
dent's estate under its construction of the contract. In eliminating
,8 225 N.Y. at 487, 122 N.E. at 629.
"1 112 Ohio App. 31, 175 N.E.2d 98 (1959).
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the proceeds of the accident policy from the survivor's liability
under the contract, the appellate court stated that:
As we read the words of the contracting parties, we are of the
opinion that reasonable minds could conclude only that these men
of business meant that their lives should be insured against death
from any cause in the amount of ten thousand dollars, and that
insurance covering death from accident alone was not intended.
A life is not insured, as that term is employed by ordinary men of
business, if the insurance is limited to death by accident alone.50
The court further held that the survivor could keep the additional
10,000 dollars in life insurance proceeds not required by the con-
tract.5 '
The outcome in Clark thus depended solely on the construction
of a contract entered into by two "ordinary men of business." Noel,
on the other hand, involved a construction of the Internal Revenue
Code, which certainly was not drafted by "ordinary men of busi-
ness," and required the use of a much different technique of con-
struction.
Finally, the Third Circuit relied upon Orr v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America,5 2 a case in which the insured owned a life insurance
contract with an accidental death benefits "rider." This rider pro-
vided that the accidental death benefits provision should be null and
void when any of the non-forfeiture provisions of the base policy be-
came operative.53 The insured defaulted on premium payments, after
which his life insurance coverage was extended by the non-forfeiture
provisions of the base policy for an additional 288 days. During this
extension the insured was killed in an automobile accident. The in-
surer admitted liability under the base policy, but denied liability
" Id. at 38, 175 N.E.2d at 103.
51 Id. at 41, 175,N.E.2d at 104-05.
u 274 Mass. 212, 174 N.E. 204 (1931).
" The rider read as follows:
"In addition to the insurance under the policy to which this rider is attached, and
subject to the provisions of said Policy, the Company will pay at its Home Office,
as an Accidental Death Benefit,--Ten Thousand-Dollars, to the Beneficiary ... under
said Policy . .. immediately upon receipt of due proof [that such death occurred
during the continuance of said Policy] while there was no default in the, payment
of premium, as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily
injuries, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means . ..and that
such death occurred within sixty days of the accident. . . . These provisions as to
Accidental Death Benefits shall become null and void if any of the Non-forfeiture
Provisions of said Policy shall be operative, and the Accidental Death Benefit or the
extra premium hereinbefore mentioned shall not be included in determining any
value or extention period under said provisions." Id. at 213-14, 174 N.E. at 204.05.
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under the accidental death benefits rider. The beneficiary contended
that the nullity provision of the rider was unenforceable because it
was printed in type smaller than that required by statute for policies
of insurance "against loss or damage ...or death by accident of
the assured. . . .",4 The trial judge ruled that this statute was
inapplicable because the policy in question was a life insurance
policy according to legislative classification. Although agreeing with
the trial court's reasoning, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chussetts provided an alternative ground for its decision. Even as-
suming that the statute could be construed to apply to life policies
with accidental death benefit clauses, the appellate court held that
it could not be used to impose a new obligation on the insurer
which would not have existed if the voidability provisions had
complied with the statute.55
Upon examination it will be seen that the reasoning of the Orr
case is inapplicable to Noel. The decision in Orr rests on the power
of the legislature of Massachusetts to regulate insurance companies
and policies according to its own scheme of classification. Its classifi-
cation is not binding on the courts or legislatures of any other
jurisdiction. Neither is it binding on (although it may be help-
ful to) the courts of Massachusetts in deciding cases that pre-
sent the "life insurance-accident insurance" issue in a different con-
text. Moreover, although the legislative classification argument
seemed conclusive, the court felt it necessary to demonstrate that the
result would have been the same regardless of how it had decided
the classification issue. Thus, citation of the Orr case as authority for
the proposition that there is a clear distinction between "life" and
"accident" insurance seems unwarranted.
I The examination of these four cases indicates that they do not
support the distinction which the Third Circuit attempted to draw
in Noel. The most that can be said for them is that for some pur-
poses, and as a matter of statutory or contractual interpretation,
54 Mass. Acts 1910, ch. 493, § I provided that:
"No policy of insurance against loss or damage from disease or by the bodily
injury or death by accident of the assured shall be issued or delivered in this common-
wealth .. . (c) .. .unless every part is plainly printed in type not smaller than
long primer or ten point type ...."
r "We think the contract of insurance was not void in respect to the part so
printed, but was enforceable to the extent of the right and obligation which would
be created by the insurance contract if the statute in reference to the printing were
not violated." 274 Mass. at 216, 174 N.E. at 205.
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courts have sometimes recognized a distinction between accident
insurance and life insurance. (Of course, the converse is also true.)56
In each case, the distinction depended upon factors not presented
in Noel: ambiguous wording in the insurance contract or applica-
tion, plus the familiar rule of construction in favor of the insured;
construction of private agreements to effectuate the presumed in-
tention of the parties; or construction of state regulatory statutes
directed toward "life insurance corporations" or ."policies of insur-
ance against death by accident."
The crucial question raised by the Noel case is not whether, in
some jurisdictions, under some circumstances, "accident insurance"
is treated differently from "life insurance." The real question is
whether or not the proceeds of a particular type of policy, provid-
ing for payment to a named beneficiary in case of death by accident,
are includible in the gross estate of the insured as "insurance under
policies on the life of the decedent," under section 2042 (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Discussion must proceed from the statute
itself, and its predecessors.
III
LIFE INSURANCE AND THE ESTATE TAx
A. Section 2042
The Revenue Act of 1916 contained no provision explicitly
taxing proceeds of life insurance. Although proceeds of insurance
payable to the estate of the decedent were regarded as taxable
under the act, 7 the taxability of such proceeds payable to other
beneficiaries was doubtful. Consequently, the Revenue Act of 1918
expressly included proceeds of life insurance in the gross estate of
the insured.58 All proceeds payable to the insured's estate were in-
60 See, e.g., Geisler v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 159 Kan. 452, 155 P.2d
435 (1945); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Rimmer, 157 Tenn. 597, 12 S.W.2d
365 (1928).
rT Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202 (a), 39 Stat. 777, taxed all property subject
to payment of charges against the estate and expenses of administration, and distrib-
utable as part of the decedent's estate. The House report accompanying the Revenue
Act of 1918 stated that "insurance payable to the executor or to the estate is now
regarded as falling within section 202 (a) of the existing statute and this construction
of the existing statute is now written into the new bill for the sake of clearness.
The amendment will serve the further purpose of putting on notice those who
acquaint themselves with the statute for the purpose of making more definite plans
for the disposition of their property." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 102
(1918).
" Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. 1098. That section provided
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cludible; proceeds payable to other beneficiaries were includible
if they exceeded 40,000 dollars and the policies had been taken out
by the decedent upon his own life. This provision was re-enacted
in 1924, 59 and remained in effect 'until 1942. Its construction was
the issue in the Ackerman case,60 where the insured's widow was
named beneficiary of several policies payable in the event of acci-
dental death. Although the aggregate amount of the proceeds ex-
ceeded the statutory exemption, the executor did not include them
in the insured's gross estate on the ground that the statute included
only proceeds of "life insurance," whereas the proceeds involved
were from "accident insurance." The Board of Tax Appeals re-
jected the executor's contention, stating that:
It is well recognized that there is a distinction between life insur-
ance and accident insurance, the former insuring against death in
any event and the latter (where accidental death policies are in-
volved) against death under certain contingencies, but we fail to
see why one is not taken out upon the life of the policy holder as
much as the other. In each case the risk assumed by the insurer is
the loss of the insured's life, and the payment of the insurance
money is contingent upon the loss of life.... The provisions of
Section 302 (g) are broad enough to include both classes of insur-
ance and we find nothing which would permit us, even under the
general rule of resolving doubts in the construction of taxing
statutes against the Government .and in favor of the taxpayer, to
exclude amounts received as accident insurance from its applica-
tion.61
In the intervening thirty-five years before Noel, this classic state-
ment apparently was never controverted by Congress or the judici-
ary.
The first, and only, Supreme Court interpretation of section
302 (g) occurred in Helvering v. Le Gierse.62 There the decedent,
a woman eighty years of age, had purchased a life insurance policy
jointly with a lifetime annuity. No physical examination was re-
quired, and the policy would not have been issued without the
that the gross estate should include "the amount receivable by the executor as in-
surance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
" Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302 (g), 43 Stat. 305.
:015 B.T.A. 635 (1929). See text accompanying notes 6-8, 13 supra.
,Lld. at 637-38. (Emphasis added.)
6.2312 U.S. 531 (1941).
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annuity contract. 3 Her executors contended that since the insur-
ance proceeds were less than the 40,000 dollar statutory exemption,
they were not includible in the decedent's gross estate. The Com-
missioner argued that the insurance-annuity combination was not
"insurance,"- but rather a transfer taking effect at death and thus
fully taxable.0 Since section 302 (g) applied to proceeds "receivable
by other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life," the outcome depended upon the
Court's interpretation of the word "insurance." (This distinguishes
Le Gierse from Noel, where the proceeds were admittedly insurance,
but the interpretation of the phrase "on the life of the decedent"
was in controversy.)
After an examination of the legislative history and administra-
tive interpretations of section 302 (g), the Court was forced to con-
clude that "conventional aids to construction are of little assistance
here."10 5' This was quite an understatement. The committee reports
indicated only that section 302 (g) was intended to close a tax loop-
hole by bringing into the gross estate the proceeds of life insurance
payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent.0 6 The Treasury
Regulations defined insurance as "life insurance of every descrip-
tion, including death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies,
operating under the lodge system."0 17 (That definition has never
been clarified and is still in effect.)68 Relying primarily upon the
usage of the term "insurance," the Court held that Congress in-
tended section 302 (g) to apply only to transactions involving an
0" Id. at 537.
"Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, a re-enactment of Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 402 (c), 40 Stat. 1097, taxed transfers by a decedent "in contemplation
of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302 (c), 44 Stat. 70.
0"'312 U.S. at 538.
6 "The provision with respect to specific beneficiaries has been included for the
reason that insurance payable to such beneficiaries usually passes under a contract
to which the insurance company and the individual beneficiary are the parties in
interest and over which the executor exercises no control. Amounts passing 'in this
way are not liable for expenses of administration or debts of the decedent and
therefore do not fall within the existing provisions defining the gross estate. It
has been brought to the attention of the Committee that wealthy persons have and
now anticipate resorting to this method of defeating the estate tax. Agents of in-
surance companies have openly urged persons of wealth to take out additional in-
surance payable to specific beneficiaries for the reason that such insurance would
not be included in the gross estate." H.R. RaP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1918); S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 42 (1918).
" Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1919).
"8 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (1) (1958).
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actual shifting of the risk of economic loss resulting from prema-
ture death.69 Viewing the transaction as a whole, the Court found
no risk-shifting in the policy-annuity transactions; the two contracts
involved opposite risks, and in combination each neutralized the
risk of the other. The total consideration exceeded the face amount
of the policy. Interest would meet the annuity obligations as long
as the policyholder lived, and at her death the principal would pay
the "life insurance" obligation. Thus, the Court held that this was
an investment, not insurance. As a result, the proceeds were fully
taxable under section 302 (c) as a transfer taking effect at death.
Two justices dissented without opinion.
Ackerman is cited twice in Le Gierse, as authority for statements
that: (1) the elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing are es-
sential to a life insurance contract; 70 and (2) it may be assumed
that Congress meant to tax proceeds of a transfer possessing these
features.7 1
It is submitted that Le Gierse is clear authority for two proposi-
tions: (1) "Insurance," as that term was used in section 302 (g),
means any transaction by which the risk of loss from premature
death is shifted from the decedent to the insurer; and (2) Congress
intended this broad construction of section 302 (g). Since Ackerman
was cited in support of the holding on both of these propositions,
there can be no doubt that seven justices approved its rationale.
Although section 302 (g) appeared to be applicable only to poli-
cies taken out by the decedent upon his own life, it was never really
so construed by the Treasury. Even though someone other than the
insured applied for and obtained the policy, naming a person other
than the decedent or his estate as beneficiary, the regulations in-
sisted that the proceeds might nevertheless be taxed to the decedent's
estate. The Treasury vacillated, however, over the test of includ-
ability: first, payment of premiums by the decedent was held suffi-
cient;72 later, possession of incidents of ownership in the policy was
required, in addition to the payment of premiums;78 still later,
payment of premiums and possession of incidents of ownership were
09 312 U.S. at 542.
701d. at 539. Note the use of the term "life insurance contract," even though some
of the policies in Ackerman were technically accident policies.
711d. at 540.
7 3 Treas. Reg. 87, art. 32 (1919).
73 Treas. Reg. 70, arts. 25, 27 (1926).
[Vol. 1965: 32
THE NOEL CASE
accepted as alternative tests of includibility.74 Congress adopted
this final Treasury interpretation in 1942,75 at the same time deleting
the 40,000 dollar exemption for insurance proceeds payable to
beneficiaries other than the insured's estate. There was no change
in the definition of insurance.
In 1950, the Second Circuit thwarted an attempt to impose a
narrow, technical construction on this statute in the case of Com-
missioner v. Treganowan.7 There the decedent was a member of
the New York Stock Exchange, which paid 20,000 dollars to his
widow because of his death. The payment came from a "gratuity
fund" originally acquired through assessment of members and allo-
cation of part of the net profits of the exchange. Each new member
of the exchange was required to make an initial contribution of
fifteen dollars to the fund. The fund guaranteed to pay 20,000
dollars to the widow and children of any deceased member, and
each surviving member could be assessed fifteen dollars to provide
this fund.77 The fund was highly solvent because of additions from
net profits-so solvent, in fact, that current payments could be met
out of accumulated income, and no membership assessment had
been made for nine years preceding the decedent's death.
The Commissioner claimed that the payment to the decedent's
widow from this fund was includible in his gross estate as insur-
ance proceeds. The Tax Court held in favor of the estate on the
ground that the gratuity fund involved no risk-shifting as required
by Le Gierse. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the risk
of premature death of a member was passed on to the group. That
is, if a member died prematurely the amount paid to his survivors
would be more than the total of his contributions to the fund. The
plan was actually very similar to the scheme evolved by medieval
guilds and later used by fraternal benefit societies.78 Thus, the court
held that the fund constituted insurance under the Le Gierse test.79
7' Treas. Reg. 80, arts. 25, 27 (1937).
71 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944.
76 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950), reversing 13 T.C. 159(1949).
'"With 1374 living members (as of 1950), the exchange could easily meet this
obligation. Any member who failed to pay an assessment was subject to loss of his
seat. 183 F.2d at 289-90.
78 BAYE, HISTORY AND OPERATION OF FRATERNAL INSURANCE 11, 18-19, 22.40 (1919).
"The decedent had no power to assign his rights in the fund or designate the
beneficiary. His interest in the fund (and the interests of his beneficiaries as pre-
scribed by the constitution of the exchange) would terminate, however, if he sold
Vol. 1965: 32]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The executors had argued that the fund was not "life insurance"
as the term is commonly used. They also pointed out that the
assessments bore no relation to the age, health or living habits of
the members; no medical examination was required, and no use
was made of actuarial computations or mortality tables. To this
contention. Judge Clark* retorted, "[T]hese do not appear to be
essentials."80 In his separate opinion, dissenting on another issue,81
Judge Learned Hand was even more specific, stating that:
The respondent's argument, as I understand it, is that in the tax
statute the word should be limited to conventional life insurance,
based upon adequate actuarial bases, and perhaps limited by the
eXiclusion of bad risks. That appears to me must [sic] too circum-
scribed a reading of the phrase: 'Insurance of every description.'
Back of the statute lies the purpose, I think, to include in a man's
estate whatever provision he may have made for his successors,
which depends on his death, and which he has secured by means
of 'premiums' or 'other considerations,' paid during his life.82
The Supreme Court denied certiorari,8 3 and the Tax Court has fol-
lowed Treganowan.84
The 1954 Code eliminated the premium payment test for insur-
ance payable to other beneficiaries, leaving incidents of ownership
as the sole test of includibility8 5 Like the 1918 and 1942 acts, the
1954 Code contains no express definition of "life insurance." Sec-
tion 2042 (2) employs the same phraseology as the 1942 act concern-
ing includibility of proceeds receivable by "beneficiaries as insur-
ance under policies on the life of the decedent."
In its consideration of the Noel case the Tax Court concluded
that section 2042 (2), "although significantly different in other re-
spects, is substantially identical [to section 302 (g) of the Revenue
his seat..This was found to be a sufficient incident of ownership to satisfy the
statutory requirement. 183 F.2d at 292-93. Judge Hand dissented from this part
of the opinion. Although he agreed that the fund proceeds were insurance, he did
not agree that the de&dent had retained incidents of ownership. Accordingly, he
would have included in the gross estate only that proportion of the proceeds which was
represented by premiums paid after the effective date of the 1942 amendment. Id. at
294.
sId. at 291 (citing Estate of Keller v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941), a
co'mpahion case to Le Gierse).
81 See note 79 supra.
"2 183 F.2d at 293. In his discussion of the phrase "insurance of every description,"
Judge Hand evidently confused the regulations with the statutory terminology.
8" See note 76 supra.
B4 Estate of William E. Edmonds, 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951).
"1 See note 5 supra.
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Act of 1924] ... in relation to the question whether the accident
policies constitute 'insurance . . .on the life of the decedent.' "88
The Third Circuit apparently agreed, since it made no attempt to
distinguish the Ackerman case on the basis of the 1942 amendment.
The Third Circuit did not mention Le Gierse or Treganowan
in its opinion. This was a shocking oversight, since these are ap-
parently the only two appellate opinions that have directly considered
the ambit of section 2042 (2) and its predecessors. Moreover, Acker-
man was dismissed by the court of appeals with the remark that the
construction of the statute was erroneous in that case, as was the
Tax Court's construction in Noel.87 Similarly, the Treasury's defini-
tion of insurance-unchanged since 1918 and subjected to a broad,
non-technical construction in Ackerman, Le Gierse and Treganowan
with the silent acquiescence of Congress-was discarded with the
comment, "We find this definition of little assistance in the instant
case."'8 8 The opinion then proceeded to a discussion of the "ordi-
nary, plain and generally accepted meaning" of section 2042 (2),
under which it arrived at the "distinction" discussed earlier.
Where the meaning of a statute is doubtful, deference should
be accorded to the interpretation given the provision by the agency
charged with its administration. 89 The reason for this is that if
"such construction does not properly interpret the meaning and
intent of Congress, [then Congress] . . . can readily correct the
same."00 Congressional re-enactment of the statute without change
justifies the inference that the administrative interpretation is cor-
rect. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "the re-enactment by
Congress, without change, of a statute, which had previously re-
ceived long continued executive construction, is an adoption by
Congress of such construction."9' Although the Court has not ad-
hered to this rule when it felt the administrative determination
clearly erroneous, 92 it does not lightly disregard the coordinate
80 39 T.C. at 470.
87 332 F.2d at 952.
88 1d. at 951.
80 United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136 (1895); Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S.
607 (1888).
80 Mayes v. Paul Jones & Co., 270 Fed. 121, 130 (6th Cir. 1921).
11 United States v. Hermanos, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908). See Helvering v. Winmill,
305 U.S. 79, 82 (1938); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145 (1920);
United States v. Falk, 204 U.S. 143, 152 (1907).
8 2Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573 582 (1938); Koshland v. Helvering, 298
U.S. 441, 445 (1936).
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judgment of the other two governmental branches in matters of
statutory construction. The deference accorded administrative regu-
lations may result in a "trite and distinctly unrealistic canon of
construction,"93 but this risk is not unreasonable when contrasted
with the dangers inherent in judicial disregard of settled, legisla-
tively-accepted interpretations. In the Noel case, observance of the
usual rules of construction would have led to a more equitable
result.9 4
The Third Circuit's final departure from the pre-existing ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretations of section 2042 (2) was its
assertion that the inclusion of air travel insurance proceeds in the
decedent's gross estate would "lead to an unreasonable result at
variance with the intent of Congress and the manifest purpose of
the statute as a whole."95 Corroboration for this amazing statement
was found in the legislative history of section 2042 and its prede-
cesssors, from which the court concluded that "the purpose of [sec-
tion 2042 (2)] .... like that of its earliest predecessor, is to foreclose
resort to the purchase of life insurance as a means of tax avoid-
ance."90
The court evidently assumed that accidental death benefit poli-
cies will not be purchased for purposes of tax avoidance. This
assumption is open to serious question. It is well known that tax
planning, particularly the minimizing of death taxes, is an integral
part of estate planning. The knowledge that proceeds of such insur-
ance can be passed on to beneficiaries other than the insured with-
out being included in the decedent's gross estate may well induce
executives whose work requires considerable air travel to purchase
large amounts of this type of insurance. Furthermore, if the Noel
rationale is extended to proceeds of other types of accident insur-
ance,97 as well as to proceeds of death benefit provisions in ordinary
life insurance policies, their exemption from the estate tax will
,8 Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1049
(1939).
See discussion of equities p. 55 infra.
9' 332 F.2d at 954.
"Ibid. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
97 Curiously, Noel's executors included in his gross estate the proceeds of an
"aviation accident policy" issued by The Maryland Casualty Company. It was de-
scribed as a term rather than a trip policy. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, p. 27a.
When questioned by the trial judge as to how this term policy differed from the
polides in litigation, the attorney for the estate answered that "probably the same
principal [sic] should apply." Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, p. 29a.
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offer a substantial inducement for additional purchases of such pol-
cies.98 Although uncertainty exists regarding the amount by which
insurance purchases may increase as a result of Noel and its possible
progeny, the Third Circuit's tacit assumption that no such increase
will occur seems almost reckless.
B. Other Sections
Even if the Third Circuit had been correct in its conclusion of
non-includibility under section 2042, this would not have been
determinative of the litigation in favor of the estate. It is recognized
that the provisions of section 2042 (2) are not exclusive; proceeds
of flight insurance may well be taxable under other provisions of
the Code. 9 Nevertheless, the court apparently proceeded upon the
assumption that taxation of the proceeds of Noel's flight insurance
under the federal estate tax could be effected only under section
2042.
The opinion acknowledged the fact that Noel possessed exercis-
able incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his death,100
and section 2033 expressly includes in the gross estate all property
owned by the decedent at his death. 01 Since the policy was owned
by the insured and the proceeds were transferred by reason of his
death, a discussion of taxability under section 2033 would seem to
have been mandatory. 02
Moreover, Noel retained the right to assign or surrender the
08 Cf. 21 J. TAXATION 163, 164 (1964):
"In cases of death due to accident, the insurance proceeds would be includable in
the victim's estate if they were paid under a life policy. However, if he had been
tax conscious enough to have his life policy written so as to exclude accidental
death (assuming this could be done) and to have taken a separate accident policy
for such an eventuality, the proceeds would be tax-free. This could be a significant
tax difference, especially since many life policies provide double indemnity for
accidental death. Since the Third Circuit's theory does not provide for an allocation
but prescribes a dominant purpose classification of insurance, this technique is more
than just academic. Insurance companies themselves would take interest in this
strange result, with an eye toward changing policy forms."
90 See LOWNDES & KRA , Fans.u.L ESTATE AND GiFT TAxEs 286-87 (2d ed. 1962).
206 "Each policy reserved to the insured the right to assign it or to change the
beneficiary thereof without the consent of the beneficiary originally designated. These
were exercisable incidents of ownership within the meaning of the statute." 332 F.2d
at 951.
101 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2033 provides that:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent
of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
'
10 2 Presumably, the policies would be valued for this purpose according to their
face amount. Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957).
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policies, and to change the beneficiary. These rights were exercis-
able by the decedent alone, and were in existence at the time of
his death. The beneficial interest of his wife arising out of his
contracts with the insurers was subject to these retained powers.
Thus, it is possible that the insurance proceeds could have been
taxed to Noel's estate under section 2038103 as a transfer subject to
a power to alter, amend, terminate or revoke.
Even if the court had found that Noel effected a valid assign-
ment of the policies to his wife10 4 and retained no incidents of
ownership, the estate would not necessarily have escaped taxation.
The proceeds might have been included in Noel's estate as property
transferred in contemplation of death under section 2035.105 The
estate would have been compelled to overcome a presumption in
favor of includibility by demonstrating a lifetime motive for the
transfer-a most difficult, if not impossible, task in this case.
A great deal more could be said about taxing flight insurance
proceeds under provisions of the estate tax other than section 2042.
It is the writer's thesis, however, that such proceeds are clearly
taxable under section 2042 without reference to other provisions.
This limited discussion has been inserted merely to indicate why
1 08 1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 provides in part as follows:
"SEC. 2038. REVOCABLE TRANSFERS.
"(a) IN GENEAL.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property-
"(1) TRANSFERS AFTER JUNE 22, 196.-To the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust
or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to
any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by
the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person (without
regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contempla-
tion of decedent's death."
But see Estate of Harper, 11 T.C. 717 (1948).
104 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
205 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035 provides in part as follows:
"SEC 2035. TRANSACTIONS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH.
"(a) GENERAL RuLs.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full con.
sideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of
his death."
There has been some question whether § 2035 taxes only gifts in contemplation
of certain death, to the exclusion of death by fortuitous external causes. There
seems to be no sound reason for such a distinction, however. See LOWNDES 8& KRAMER,
op. cit. supra note 99, at 70.
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the Third Circuit, having rejected the application of section 2042,
should have considered the applicability of these other provisions.
C. Equities
Apparently, the Third Circuit's excursion into the niceties of
insurance law proved so absorbing as to obscure a very obvious, but
critically important, reality: the estate tax is a revenue measure.
The provision under consideration in Noel was enacted for the ex-
press purpose of enlarging the estate tax base by the inclusion of
substantial assets created at the insured's death and transferred to
a beneficiary of his own designation. In light of the equity of the
statute there is no reason to distinguish between proceeds of flight
insurance and those of life insurance. Both types of insurance in-
volve the gratuitous transmission of wealth from a decedent to a
recipient of his choice; the recipient's ability to pay the tax out of
his proceeds 06 does not vary according to the nature of the policy;
in both cases the beneficiary receives something of a windfall, per-
haps even more so in the case of flight insurance. If the proceeds
of insurance that a decedent has maintained over a period of years
at a substantial cost are taxed, it seems most inequitable to exempt
a recovery of 125,000 dollars on an investment of only five dollars.
Since the nature of the transfer and the ability of the recipient to
pay the tax are identical, it seems entirely reasonable and fair to
impose the same tax. Viewed in this light, the Third Circuit's dis-




Finally, the Third Circuit's opinion in Noel may create uncer-
tainty as to the exclusion of accident insurance proceeds from the
income tax. Correlative to its broad view of section 2042 (2) is the
Treasury's interpretation of the clause exempting life insurance pro-
ceeds from the income tax. Code section 101 (a) requires the exclu-
sion from gross income of "amounts received . . . under a life
insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death
100 The beneficiary of insurance proceeds is liable for the payment of that portion
of the estate tax incurred because of their inclusion in the decedent's estate. INT.
REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2206.
Vol. 1965: 32]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the insured."' 1 07 This phraseology is more specific than the refer-
ence in section 2042 (2) to "policies on the life of the decedent."
Nevertheless, the Treasury's broad interpretation of section 2042 (2)
regarding includibility of life insurance proceeds in the insured's
gross estate suggests an equivalent interpretation of section 101 (a),
so that the beneficiary's exemption from the income tax is coexten-
sive with the insured's estate tax liability. The Treasury has broadly
interpreted section 101 (a) to the effect that:
Death benefit payments having the characteristics of life insur-
ance proceeds payable by reason of death under contracts, such as
workmen's compensation insurance contracts, endowment con-
tracts, or accident and health insurance contracts, are covered by
this provision.108
If the Third Circuit decision becomes a precedent the Treasury
may justifiably contend that the proceeds of such policies as those
involved in Noel are not "life insurance" for purposes of the section
101 (a) exclusion.
Should the Treasury take such a view, one countervailing argu-
ment would be that even though no longer within the exclusion
provided by section 101 (a), "accident insurance" proceeds are gifts
within the purview of the exclusion afforded by section 102 (a).10D
That is, it could be argued that the decedent has made a gift to
the beneficiary of his claim against the insurer. The transfer of
the proceeds by the insurer to the beneficiary would, of course, not
be a gift, but the discharge of a contractual obligation. Thus, the
beneficiary may well take the insured's basis 10 and realize ordinary
income to the extent that the proceeds exceed this basis."' Applying
this reasoning in the Noel case, for example, the beneficiary would
have received ordinary taxable income in the amount of 124,995
dollars." 2
Another strong countervailing argument would be that flight in-
surance proceeds are excludable under section 104 (a) (3) as
''amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal
10 7INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a).
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (a) (1957). (Emphasis added.)
"
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102 (a) provides that:
"Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance."
110 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015 (a).
111 See Cooper v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1952); Hatch v. Commission-
er, 190 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1951); Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1940).




injuries or sickness .... ,,1 This provision origifiated with the
Revenue Act of 1918, as section 213 (b) (6)."14 It became section
22 (b) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, and retained this designation
in the 1939 Code.
The provision is susceptible of a restrictive interpretation that
would limit the exclusion to proceeds of accident insurance received
by the insured himself. The Treasury, however, did not originally
contend that the exclusion was personal to the insured; from the
very first, its regulations accorded a wide ambit to the exclusion:
Whether he be alive or dead, the amounts received by an insured
or his estate or other beneficiaries through accident or health in-
surance or under workmen's compensation acts as compensation
for personal injuries or sickness are excluded from the gross in-
come of the insured, his estate and other beneficiaries."15
This interpretation remained in effect for over fifteen years. In the
regulations for the 1934 act, however, reference to section 22 (b) (5)
was eliminated." 6 The reason for this deletion is unclear, but ap-
parently it reflected a change in Treasury policy. This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that the Commissioner took the posi-
tion, in cases arising under the 1934 and 1936 acts," 7 that the acci-
dent and health insurance exclusion was personal to the insured.
This contention was advanced by the Commissioner to the Board
of Tax Appeals in Castner Garage, Ltd."18 In that case, four closely-
SINT. R, Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 104 (a) provides in part as follows:
"SEC. 104. COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS.
"(a) IN GENERAL--Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in
excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses)
for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
"(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries
or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts
(A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in
the gross income of the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer) ....
"'Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213 (b) (6), 40 Stat. 1065, provided in part as
follows:
"Sec. 213. That for the purposes of this title . . . the term 'gross income'-
(b) Does not include the following items . . .
(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount
of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries
or sickness."
"'
5 Treas, Reg. 45, art. 72 (1919).
I" See Treas. Reg. 86 (1935).
1 1 Cases cited in notes 118, 123 infra.
11843 B.T.A. 1 (1940).
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held corporations had purchased combined life, health and accident
policies covering their president, who was also their majority stock-
holder. The insured subsequently became disabled, and each cor-
poration received disability payments from the insurer. The Com-
missioner contended that the payments were not excludable under
section 22 (b) (5), but were ordinary income to the corporations.
He argued that the exclusion applied only to individuals, and that
Congress intended for it to be personal to the insured. The Board
apparently found no clue in the statute itself, for it chose to rest
its decision on the Treasury regulations in existence prior to the
1934 act. 119 On the strength of these regulations'20 the Board con-
cluded that "the exemption is not limited to the person who suffers
the personal injuries or sickness.' u 2 1 Surprisingly, the Treasury soon
acquiesced in this decision.122
The rule of the Castner Garage case was limited by the Tax
Court in People's Finance & Thrift Co.12 3 In that case a debtor as-
signed three life insurance policies to a creditor as collateral security
for the payment of his obligation. The debtor was the insured and
his estate the beneficiary under each policy. Two of the policies
provided for disability benefits. When the debtor defaulted on his
payments, the creditor offered the policies for sale at public auction,
becoming the purchaser at that sale. The insured later became dis-
abled, entitling the creditor to receive the disability payments.
The court held that since the payments were the result of a
commercial investment transaction, the creditor was not entitled to
an exclusion under section 22 (b) (5). The opinion went on to state
that:
[We think that the intent of the statute to limit the exemption to
beneficiaries of insurance policies, as such, is apparent and that it
would serve no purpose of the statute to extend the exemption to
purchasers for value. The intention of the statute is clearly ex-
pressed on its face to apply the exclusion granted only to bene-
ficiaries who suffer an otherwise uncompensated loss as the direct
221See regulation quoted in text accompanying note 115 supra.
120 "The Commissioner contends that the provision [section 22 (b) (5)J is limited
in its application to amounts received by the insured, but that argument is contrary
to his own regulations and, apparently, his practice. The regulations have held
consistently that the exemption was not limited to amounts received by the insured."
43 B.T.A. at 4.
221 Ibid.
22 1941-1 CubM. BULL. 2.
12 12 T.C. 1052 (1949), aff'd, 184 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1950).
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result of the sickness or injury of an insured in whom they have
an insurable interest.124
In a concurring opinion, Judge Disney stated that the payments
received by the creditor were not "compensation for personal in-
juries or sickness," as required by the statute, but rather constituted
compensation for an unpaid indebtedness. His interpretation of the
congressional intent underlying section 22 (b) (5) was as follows:
In my opinion, Congress dearly, by the addition of the clause as
to compensation for personal injuries or sickness, intended to pre-
vent mere receipt of money through accident or health insurance,
or under workmen's compensation acts, from being excluded from
gross income of anyone receiving it, and equally clearly intended
personal injury or sickness to mean bodily or mental injury to the
person insured or covered by workmen's compensation acts, and
did not extend the benefit of exclusion to any assignee or mere
holder of insurable interest.125
Judges Murdock and Opper agreed with Judge Disney. Apparently
they would have limited the exclusion to proceeds received by the
insured himself, whereas the majority felt that all beneficiaries of
accident and health policies were entitled to an exclusion under
section 22 (b) (5).
The accident and health insurance exclusion was re-enacted as
section 104 of the 1954 Code, with an additional parenthetical clause
denying the exclusion for amounts received by an employee but
attributable to contributions by his employer which were not in-
cluded in his gross income.128 The committee reports indicate that
this was the only substantial departure from prior law intended.
The House report stated that:
With respect to all other amounts [i.e., amounts not received by an
employee as a result of proscribed employer contributions], section
104 of this bill will apply in the same manner as section 22 (b) (5)
of the 1939 Code. Thus, any amount received as workmen's com-
pensation under a workman's compensation act will continue to be
excludable from gross income under section 104, as will any
amount received by a taxpayer under a policy of accident or health
insurance purchased by him.127
12 12 T.C. at 1055.
125 Id. at 1057.
128 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104 (a) (3).
'I H.R. RPE. No. 1337, 83rd Gong., 2d Sess. A32 (1954).
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The Senate report, after discussing the exception for employer con-
tributions not attributed to employees, stated that:
It [section 104] will continue to exclude from gross income (in the
same manner as section 22 (b) (5) of the 1939 Code) any amount
received as workmen's compensation under a workmen's compen-
sation act, as well as any amount received by a taxpayer under a
p6licy of accident or health insurance purchased by him.128
The regulations promulgated with respect to section 104 (a) (3)
follow the same pattern as the committee reports. The primary
emphasis is on the treatment of proceeds paid to employees from"
funds or insurance arising out of their employment. The only refer-
ence to health or accident insurance purchased by individuals is
the following:
If, therefore, an individual purchases a policy of accident or
health insurance out of his own funds, amounts received there-
under for personal injuries or sickness are excludable from his
gross income under section 104 (a) (3). See, however, section 213
and the regulations thereunder as to the inclusion in gross income
of amounts attributable to deductions allowed under section 213
for any prior taxable year.UQ
The regulations and committee reports thus raise two questions:
(1) Must the coverage be on the individual who purchases it, or
may a policyholder obtain an exclusion for proceeds of any policy
he may purchase covering another person in whose life and health
he has. an insurable interest? (2) Is the exclusion available only to
the purchaser-owner of the policy, or may it be utilized by a bene-
ficiary who is not the purchaser of the policy? The more restrictive
interpretation can be argued in view of the reference in the regula-
tions to purchases by the individual out of his own funds. But
Castner Garage and People's Finance & Thrift Co. indicate that the
broader interpretation was given to section 22 (b) (5)-and section
104 (a) (3) was not, according to the committee reports, intended to
"0 S. REP. No 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1954).
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1 (d) (1956). The exclusion is limited to amounts in excess
of premiums paid and deducted under § 213 in the year the illness or disability
occurred. The Treasury contends that premiums for accident and disability insurance
are not deductible under section 213 except to the extent that they provide indemnity
for hospital and medical expenses. Rev. Rul. 331, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 271. The Third
Circuit has ruled, contrary to the Treasury position, that premiums paid for health
and accident policies are deductible in their entirety. Heard v. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1959). The Commissioner has not acquiesced, but the Tax Court
follows the Heard case. Compare Rev. Rul. 393, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 457 with J. D.
Edwards, 39 T.C. 78 (1962) and D. G. Kilgore, 38 T.C. 340 (1962).
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change the law in this respect. Accordingly, the conclusion seems
inescapable that section 104 continues the section 22 (b) (5) exclusion
for "beneficiaries who suffer an otherwise uncompensated loss as
the direct result of the sickness or injury of an insured in whom
they have an insurable interest."13 0
It thus appears to be immaterial whether flight insurance is
termed "life insurance" or "accident insurance" for income tax pur-
poses. If the former designation is applied, the beneficiary is en-
titled to an income tax exclusion under section 101 (a). If the
latter characterization is employed, then apparently the exclusion
is afforded by section 104 (a) (3).131
V
CONCLUSION
It has been the primary purpose of this article to show that there
is no justification for allowing an estate tax exemption for flight in-
surance proceeds-or any other form of accidental death benefits.
While the distinction between "accident insurance" and "life insur-
ance" may be significant in other contexts, it is meaningless in light
of the history and long-standing interpretation (both administrative
and judicial) of section 2042 (2) and its predecessors. That Congress
intended no narrow, technical construction of section 2042 is indi-
cated by its acquiescence in this broad interpretation for over thirty-
five years.
A second objective has been to establish that proceeds of flight
insurance are excludable from gross income under the income tax.
It is hoped that the foregoing analysis has adequately demon-
strated the unsoundness of the Third Circuit's opinion in Noel and
contributed to the rehabilitation of Ackerman.
100 12 T.C. at 1055.
1 Contra, Pyle, Accident and Sickness Insurance Under Sections 104, 105, 106 and
213 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 1956 INs. L.J. 51, 59; 34 TAXEs 363, 371 (1956):
"In my opinion, Sections 104-106 do not cover accidental death benefits in life
insurance, endowment or accident and health contracts, the benefits in those sections
being solely those received for 'personal injuries or sickness.'"
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